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NOTES AND COMMENTS
A New Footnote in Erie v. Tompkins: "Cannon Is Overruled"
At dawn one recent day I dreamed that St. Peter had granted my
request to enter the golden portals to consult Justice Brandeis about
a most pressing matter. It was certainly not a bad dream, although it
must have had its genesis in my brooding over the opinion in Berkman
v. Ann Lewis Shops,1 decided last June by the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals. What is surprising is that I escaped a nightmare after
reading in the opinion such words as "the leading case of Cannon Mfg.
Co. v. Cudahy Packing";2 "the defendant was not 'doing business'
within the meaning of that phrase as it was construed in the Cannon
case" ;3 and "we do not believe that the Florida legislature... intended
to 'overrule' the Cannon rule."4 Students in my Conflicts classes had
often heard me say with much confidence that, after Erie,5 Cannon was
as obsolete as Swift v. Tyson.6 The common authorship of the opinions
in both cases did not negate that conclusion; until the Erie revolution,
even the most outspoken critics of the "general federal common law"
doctrine often joined in decisions and even wrote opinions that applied
it.7 I was sure, however, that, once liberated by his own victory in
Erie v. Tompkins, Justice Brandeis would be ready to disown his opinion
in Cannon.
In the Cannon case a North Carolina corporation brought an action
in North Carolina for breach of contract against a Maine corporation.
The statutes of North Carolina then, as they do now, authorized service
on a local agent of any foreign corporation "doing business" in the
state.8 The only service on the defendant Maine corporation was
effected by delivery of the summons and complaint in North Carolina
to the officer in charge of the local operations of an affiliated Alabama
corporation doing business in North Carolina. The Alabama corporation
was a wholly owned subsidiary of the defendant Maine corporation;
they had interlocking directors and officers; they did a great deal of com-
mon business. The plaintiff contended that there was such identity of
the two corporations that their separate entities should be disregarded
'246 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1957).2 267 U.S. 333 (1925). Quotation from 246 F.2d at 47.
1246 F.2d at 47.
'Id. at 49.
'Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
0 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
'See, e.g., Justice Holmes' opinion in Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Goodman, 275
U.S. 66 (1927).
' C.S. § 1137 (1924) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-38 (1950), 55-144 (Supp. 1955).
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and the business done in North Carolina by the subsidiary should be
deemed business done by the parent. After service of the summons the
case was removed to the United States District Court on grounds of
diversity of citizenship.
The district judge agreed with counsel that the issue was whether,
under the facts of the intercorporate relationship, the defendant was to
be treated as "doing business" in North Carolina. After carefully
analyzing the activities of the two corporations and their officers, he
reached the conclusion that there were separate legal entities and that
service on the subsidiary was not equivalent to service on the parent.
In his opinion, rejecting the attempted service, he cited no state court
decisions, but relied heavily on the United States Supreme Court's
holding in Peterson v. Chicago, R. I. & Pac. Ry.9  His decision was
unanimously affirmed by the Supreme Court,10 with Justice Brandeis
writing an opinion that also referred to no decisions of North Carolina
courts. One Alabama decision was cited," but none on the "doing
business" issue.
In my dream I climbed "up there" to see if Justice Brandeis would
agree that the Cannon case should be expressly and ceremoniously in-
terred in the tomb with Swift v. Tyson. If the author of the offending
opinion felt as I did, and would give some concrete indication of his
concurrence, earthly judges, I felt sure, would at long last be constrained
to stop relying on its outworn rationale. I was emboldened by the be-
lief that none of the Justice's economic predilections would be offended
if the decision as to what is "doing business" were left with the state
courts. Perhaps, of course, his conclusion that there was no jurisdiction
over the defendant in the Cannon case could be traced to his preference
for small business units. Nevertheless, he could have had no reason to
believe that North Carolina judges would have tended to foster bigness
by finding a closer tie between parent and subsidiary than had the federal
courts. My plea for a different methodology should not necessarily
produce a different substantive outcome.
I was escorted from the pearly gates, so went my dream, to the
Brandeis quarters by a messenger with scrawny, almost featherless
wings. The great judge, on the other hand, was pillowed by a great
mass of white wing feathers as he reclined on a throne-like chair. Ex-
cept for the feathers, he looked much as one remembered him at the teas
served at his Washington home after he retired from the bench.' 2
I commented on the magnificence of his wings and asked how one
'205 U.S. 364 (1907).
"Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 292 Fed. 169 (W.D.N.C. 1923),
aff'd, 267 U.S. 333 (1925).
"First Nat'l Bank v. Winchester, 119 Ala. 168, 24 So. 351 (1898).
12 See MAsoN, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LiFE 603-04 (1946).
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obtained such a fine set. He answered that each feather was supposed to
represent an achievement during life, and he had, he supposed, been
lucky. I then noticed that each feather was marked with a name or
title, and I could see the words "Muller v. Oregon,"'3 "Savings Bank
Life Insurance," and other familiar names here and there. To get to
the point of my visit promptly and thus be able to finish before the
Justice's personal guardian angel, fluttering near by, should declare
the interview over, I asked if by any chance there was a feather for his
opinion in Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing.
Justice Brandeis assured me that there was.
"My Secretary pointed out," he said, "that it has been cited over a
hundred times,' 4 and so he included it in the list when applying for my
wings. He insisted that anything cited a hundred times is worthy of a
feather in one's wing. But why do you ask about that particular case?"
Then I told him what was troubling me. I pointed out that lower
courts have continually relied on Cannon to strike down service on a
foreign corporation operating in a state only through a subsidiary. The
able students on the board of the Columbia Law Review have, in an
otherwise perceptive comment, called Cannon "the leading case in this
area" and "still the law today."'15 A leading, up-to-date casebook on
Conflict of Laws cites it without a caveat to beware of its possible feet
of clay.1 Even the Supreme Court has since Erie used it in a footnote as
though it still carried weight.17 The courts keep citing it to support
the principle that such a corporation is not, in the words of the state
statute, "doing business" there. With that citation they stop, not con-
sidering it necessary to seek state court rulings on the meaning of those
words in that particular statute.' 8 In at least one horrible example, 19
a district judge had analyzed the law of North Carolina-Cannon's own
state-and had found that the defendant before him had been engaged in
activities that he thought the North Carolina courts would have found
to be "doing business" there. Then he said, "For what the law actually
is, however, I must consider the decision of the United States Supreme
Court in Cannon Manufacturing v. Cudahy Packing Co.... The Can-
non Case has not been overruled and.. . , not being distinguishable so far
"208 U.S. 412 (1908).
"4 See SHEPARD'S UNITED STATES CITATIONS (Case ed. 1943 and Supps. 1952,
1956, 1957).
11 Note, 56 COLUM. L. REv. 394, 409 (1956).
1' CHEATHAM, GooDRIcH, GRISWOLD AND REEcE, CONFLIcr OF LAWS: CASES
AND MATERIALS 129 (1957).
27 National Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner, 336 U.S. 422, 439, n. 31 (1949).11 See, e.g., LeVecke v. Griesedieck Western Brewery Co., 233 F.2d 772, 776
(9th Cir. 1956).
"Harris v. Deere & Co., 128 F. Supp. 799 (E.D.N.C. 1955), affd, 223 F.2d
161 (4th Cir. 1955).
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as I can see, seems to settle the question and requires me to hold with
the defendant.120
I asked Justice Brandeis if this course of action did not strike him
as committing the pre-Erie error of assuming the existence of "a trans-
cendental body of law outside of any particular state."121 He listened
with his renowned politeness as I cited a number of recent cases that
have treated, rightly, it seemed to me, the issue whether a defendant
is "doing business" in the state as a question exclusively of state law.
22
Bornze v. Nardis Sportswear2 3 is a good example. Judge Learned
Hand there said that "the first question is whether the service was
valid under the New York decisions .... [I] f we conclude that it was,
there arises the second question: i.e., whether the service was valid under
the Constitution. ' 24 Farther along in the opinion Judge Hand seems to
have been expressing doubt as to the validity of the Cannon approach,
for he said of another case,25 "In any event the majority cited only
federal decisions, and apparently proceeded on the assumption that
these were conclusive .... "26 His whole opinion reflected the view that
the International Shoe case27 was not an interpretation of a state statute,
but a test of the constitutionality of the state's interpretation of its own
law.
The premise of my plea, I pointed out to Justice Brandeis, was that
the Court in International Shoe was merely holding that a state does not
exceed its jurisdictional powers if it interprets the "doing business"
phrase in its statute as including the kind of activities found in that case.
The Supreme Court certainly was not suggesting that the question of
what constitutes "doing business" is a matter of "general law" that a
federal court can find as readily as a state court. It expressly accepted,
I continued, the statutory interpretation previously declared by the state
court. It was a state statute they were interpreting, and in the words
of Justice Frankfurter in another case, the last word on its meaning
20 Id. at 804-05.
21 Black and White Taxicab and Transfer Co. v. Brown and Yellow Taxicab
and Transfer Co., 267 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) ; Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,
79 (1938).
22 Riverbank Laboratories v. Hardwood Products Corp., 220 F.2d 465 (7th
Cir. 1955); Partin v. Michaels Art Bronze Co., 202 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1953);
Pulson v. American Rolling Mill Co., 170 F.2d 193 (1st Cir. 1948); Hilmes v.
Marlin Firearms Co., 136 F. Supp. 307 (D. Minn. 1955); Solt v. Interstate
Folding Box Co., 133 F. Supp. 7 (E.D. Pa. 1955) ; Kenny v. Alaska Airlines, 132
F. Supp. 838 (S.D. Cal. 1955) ; Radford v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 128 F.
Supp. 775 (E.D. Tenn. 1955). See also Roberts v. Evans Case Co., 218 F.2d
893 (th Cir. 1955).
165 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1948).
21Id. at 35.
"Deutsch v. Hoge, 146 F2d 201 (2d Cir. 1944).
21 165 F.2d at 37.
27 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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belonged neither to the Supreme Court of the United States nor any
other federal court, but to the supreme court of the state. 28
The Justice seemed ready to comment, and, though still dreaming,
I awaited his words anxiously. I had staked a lot to get his help in
eliminating one aberration in the twisted course of private international
law.
"Of course," Justice Brandeis observed, "Erie v. Tompkins itself
dealt with the common law, not with statutory interpretation. Still, I
imagine that if Cannon had come up after the Erie doctrine had finally
been accepted, my colleagues and I should have used a very different
approach. We surely should have sought state decisions as guides for
interpretation of the North Carolina statute. We should then have
tested that interpretation against constitutional restraints, as the Court
later did in International Shoe. But isn't it a bit late to recognize all
this? Even the Erie case couldn't overthrow res judicata."
I agreed that Cannon could not be reversed, but I pointed out that it
could be overruled. I said that, for myself, it seemed effectively over-
ruled by the words in Erie that the unconstitutionality of the Swift v.
Tyson doctrine compelled the final abandonment of that ancient prece-
dent. The bar and the courts, however, have too often not seen the cases
in that light. Since I am among those who welcome the Erie rule twenty
years later, I like to see it applied wherever it belongs, and therefore,
I told the Justice, I hoped something could be done to eliminate the
Cannon blot on the symmetry of the juridical scutcheon. I concluded
that I was certain that a few words attributed to him would have the
desired effect.
A discouraging look of doubt clouded the Justice's face. I then
waxed eloquent even in my dream, and recalled some of his own ex-
pressed views on the importance of bringing judicial opinions into agree-
ment with experience.29  "[I]t behooves us to reject, as guides," he
once said, "the decisions . . . which prove to have been mistaken," 30
especially where the precedent involves application rather than interpre-
tation of the Constitution, and where no rule of property was created,
around which vested interests had clustered.3 1 "It was you, Justice
Brandeis," I emphasized, "who first said that stare decisis, while ordi-
narily a wise rule of action, 'is not a universal, inexorable, command.' "32
More than once, I added, he had listed examples of overrulings by his
8 Railroad Conm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 499-500 (1941).
29 Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 410 (1932) " (dissenting'
opinion).
" Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 42 (1927) (dissenting opinion).
"-Washington v. Dawson Co., 264 U.S. 219, 238 (1924) (dissenting' opinion).22 Ibid.
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Court, and I reminded him that in the Gobitis33 and Barnette8 4 cases
some of the Justices had perceived the error of their own decision and
had joined in overruling it three years later.35
"How I welcomed that action," interjected the Justice. "Black and
Douglas slipped as grievously in Gobitis as Holmes had done in the
Nebraska German language case.3 6 As I have often repeated, every man
has his weak moments, and man's judgment is at best fallible.37 But
when he has seen his mistake, it is right to correct it. Perhaps the
Cannon decision was correct in the climate of its day, but I agree that
it cannot survive into the post-Erie era. However, in my present posi-
tion, what can I do about it?"
Dreaming boldly along, I explained my idea of a new footnote to be
inserted in the Erie opinion, citing Cannon as one of the errors resulting
from the invalid doctrine of Swift v. Tyson. Not surprisingly, in the
phantasy of the dream, the Justice agreed to the proposal.
I smiled a dreamy smile, picturing myself citing the new footnote as
a long overdue epitaph for Cannon. As I bid the Justice good-bye, he
picked off the floor and handed me a lovely white feather, labelled
"Cannon v. Cudahy Packing Co." Its base had begun to disintegrate,
causing it to drop off one of his wings.
When I awakened, I resolved to write the story of my dream in the
hope that there would be some readers who would recognize the sound-
ness of its message and would help to make it come true.
MICHAEL H. CARDOZO*
Constitutional Law-Due Process- Denial of Admission to State
Bar on Ground of Communist Affiliation
In Konigsberg v. State Bar,' the United States Supreme Court in a
five to three decision held that past membership in the Communist
Party is not in itself an adequate basis for denying an otherwise qualified
applicant admission to a state bar. Because the petitioner had refused
to answer questions of the California Committee of Bar Examiners con-
cerning past membership in the Communist Party, the Committee re-
fused to certify him to practice law on the grounds that he had failed to.
prove (1) that he was of good moral character, and (2) that he did not
Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
"Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
"See also Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404, 412 (1923) (dissenting opinion); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
"TNew State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 310 (1932) (dissenting
opinion).
* Professor of Law, Cornell University.
1353 U.S. 252 (1957).
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